No one, I’m sure, would quarrel with Bernstein for highlighting the possibility that a party leader in McConnell’s position might enhance his party’s interest by putting up resistance to ratification of this treaty even if he personally believed the treaty to advance U.S. interests — at least, if he knew that the resistance would ultimately fail.
Where Bernstein (judging from his blog’s Comments section) does disturb many readers — me included — is in his suggestion that it is politicians’ right, indeed their duty, to be guided entirely by such calculations. He argues, in effect, that the law of political survival is a necessary, natural, sufficient and therefore desirable prime mover of politicians’ words and actions.
Fellow political scientist/political science blogger Seth Masket replies:
I don’t want to speak for Jon here (I’m sure he’ll have a good post along these lines up shortly), but my response to this is as follows: I don’t celebrate this system. But to complain that politicians will be guided by political calculation is like complaining that businesspeople will be guided by profit maximization or that athletes are too obsessed with winning. It’s not a character flaw; it’s their line of work. Indeed, hoping for politicians who are untethered from political calculations is not only naïve, but sometimes quite dangerous.
But of course, Sprung never once wishes aloud for “politicians who are untethered from political calculations.” His disagreement with Bernstein (and by extension, Masket) is not over whether politicians should make political calculations, but over how they should determine the ends to which those calculations are directed. Is a good legislator one who makes his political calculations based primarily on (A) moral concerns, or (B) rational self-interest? Bernstein and Masket seem to prefer Option B, and this is exactly what Sprung finds so cynical.
Maybe the features of Option B that so disturb Sprung would be more apparent to Bernstein and Masket if we looked at how other sectors of society function on Planet Option B. You guys know what that means: it’s super happy fun thought experiment imagination time!
Consider the policeman. Not just any policeman. I’m talking about Policeman McNulty. What is Policeman McNulty’s job? Most people would argue that it is to maintain order, uphold the law, and keep the innocent residents of his jurisdiction (the sleepy little hamlet of New Hamsterdam) safe. As long as the NHPD rewards officers based solely on how well they fulfill those responsibilities, and does so with perfect efficiency, all is well.
But one day, mean old Commissioner Burrell decides to institute an arrest quota. Policeman McNulty now needs to bust a certain number of people per week in order to keep his job. McNulty realizes that unless he dramatically steps up his weekly arrest rate, his job is in grave danger.
Now, McNulty wants to be good po-lice. But what does that mean, exactly? In the New Hamsterdam of Planet B, it would mean responding to the incentives provided by Burrell, and boosting his arrest rate by any means necessary. This, Option B tells us, is not just part of what it means to be good po-lice: it supersedes the traditional role of the police officer, because rational self-interest dictates that it would.
But if McNulty starts cuffing jaywalkers and planting crack on people who deserve little more than speeding tickets, are we really going to argue that he is good po-lice? Or would we instead argue that he should ignore rational self-interest and fight for principles above the network of punishments and incentives built into New Hamsterdam’s law enforcement bureaucracy?
When it comes to the NHPD, Worldview B seems not just wrong, but deeply, deeply cynical. Furthermore, we have little reason to believe any different when it comes to the real world of politics.
That said, I don’t think Bernstein and Masket accept the premises of Worldview B out of conscious cynicism. Rather, I think career political scientists are likely predisposed to see a certain beauty and elegance in the system they observe that can all too easily be conflated with a sort of ethical purity. Just as Einstein saw God in physics, the biologist sees it in biology, the economist sees it in economics, and the political scientist sees it in political science. To not find some kind of magic in the subject to which one dedicates a lifetime of scholarship — that would be cynical.
But a little bit of perspective shows us that beauty in game theory is not the same thing as moral worth. We need to hold our elected officials to a higher standard than mere responsiveness to incentives. The fact that they might rarely meet that standard does not make us naïve, so long as we acknowledge those failures and their causes.